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Abstract
This project investigates the use of cyber technology as a political tool through the investigation
of the following case studies: (1) The Sony Pictures Hack in the United States in 2014, (2) The
Qatari News Hack in 2017, and (3) China’s enactment of the Hong Kong National Security Law
in 2020. These three case studies depict that rapid technological advancement has led to greater
cyber warfare between state powers. The Sony Hack examines political coercion, the Qatari
Hack examines disinformation, and the Hong Kong National Security Law examines
surveillance and suppression of opposition. As a result of an increasingly complicated
cyberspace, cyberwarfare and physical warfare are becoming more enmeshed. Solving
cybersecurity challenges requires a diverse pool of experts who can draw from multiple different
disciplines, such as sociology, political science, and public culture. The means for protecting
one’s data is no longer limited to code. Upon demonstrating how states use cyber technology to
gain political influence, this project concludes with speculations and suggestions as to how the
cybersecurity field must be addressed in the future.

Keywords: cyber conflict, cyberspace, cyberwarfare, espionage, surveillance, national security
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Introduction
Historically, only major powers––the most affluent and militarily powerful––could
effectively compete in cyberspace. The field itself was defined by the few states that could afford
to play. These competitive environments were understood to be where the quest for power lay in
international relations. Today, cyberspace is no longer limited to the global superpowers, and it
is near impossible to discuss national security without reference to cyber threats. In a digitalizing
world, cybersecurity and technology are becoming more prominent in the political context.
Sometime between June 2012 and June 2013, during what Adam Segal refers to as “Year
Zero,” a new era of geopolitical movements in cyberspace emerged. As a result, information and
communication networks became ingrained into our political, economic, and social ways of life.
Since then, we have seen significant implications for security, data privacy, and cyber laws. We
must conclude that cyber conflict will only become more belligerent, and the risks will be more
consequential as the Internet becomes more embedded in day-to-day life. Within cyberspace,
every piece of data that is put onto the Internet is of interest because of its sizable effects in the
physical world. Technology is becoming more accessible and cheaper to use, which leads to
greater vulnerability online and increased cyber warfare.
While some attribute the deterioration in the cybersecurity environment to investment or
infrastructure, I argue that the most crucial aspect of handling cybersecurity is addressing the
subject more holistically with a political and sociological background. Recent years have shown
that although we continue to invest billions into cybersecurity, we still see more sophisticated
cyber-attacks each year. There are two main reasons for this. First, the rules of cyberspace and
cyber warfare are not the same as physical or conventional warfare. In traditional military
conflict, one must consider geographical distance or state borders. The laws and concepts of the
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virtual world cannot compare to the cyber realm and its infinite proximity. Second, the
cybersecurity field is still evolving, and it is complicated to make sense of it. We still do not
know the answers to many of the important questions, such as what is the responsibility between
governments and private actors in cyber defense? What should we base international cyber
norms on? What laws and policies can hold individuals, organizations, and state governments
accountable across international boundaries?
The Sony Pictures Hack, Project Raven, and the Hong Kong National Security Law are
explored in this thesis as three individual case studies that exemplify how cybersecurity tools are
used as new methods to engage in political warfare. The Sony Hack best exemplifies how a data
breach was used to coerce and threaten a corporation that mocked its ruler. The Qatari News
Hack demonstrates how cyber tools are used to spy and influence regional politics. Lastly, the
Hong Kong National Security Law shows how digital media acts as a new platform for
protestors; additionally, this case study demonstrates the use of cybersecurity tools in censoring
and surveilling anti-government opposition. In compiling this thesis, I argue that cybersecurity is
a broadening interdisciplinary field that needs to consider behavioral approaches to best define
the nature of cyberspace challenges. In completing this thesis, my findings support prior research
that concluded that increased digitalization, technological advancement, and developing
cyber-enabled information warfare have led to greater competition in cyberspace.
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Methodology
Importance of Case Studies – Significance
The case studies that I have chosen for this project explore how state powers employ
cyber technology to influence and sway regional and international politics. These case studies
also explore the effects of digitization in international relations. My case studies on North Korea
and the United Arab Emirates demonstrate how the emerging cyberspace permits small states to
compete on the same playing field as global superpowers such as the U.S., China, and Russia.
Additionally, the Hong Kong National Security Law case study investigates digital media as a
mechanism to publicize domestic affairs to a global audience, as well as how that mechanism can
be censored by digital suppression. All three case studies share the common trait of employing
their respective technologies to pursue geopolitical aims. Due to the ongoing fluctuations in
cybersecurity developments, I found it most useful to gather data from sources from 2014 and
onward. More importantly, I would like to use my thesis as an opportunity to suggest ways to
move forward in the cyber realm.
A scientific or technical approach to handling cybersecurity challenges could help enrich
an understanding of how intrusions occur. This paradigm alone, however, does not encompass
the political or sociological motives for hacking, espionage, and disinformation, which I argue is
the most crucial aspect to understanding cyberspace. In other words, the problem is not always a
weak code or poor security, but what provoked the attack or action in the first place. I believe
that North Korea, the UAE, and Hong Kong best exemplify this argument because they highlight
the critical theme of a desire to protect state reputation. International Studies challenges us to
critique the human actors, whether they are individuals, hacker groups, or entire nation-states. I
find this the most useful way to approach cybersecurity challenges. Aside from investing in
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security development, cybersecurity requires understanding the human context in its political and
social atmosphere.

Method of Organization
This paper will first outline the previous scholarly work on conflict in cyberspace. The
literature review will develop a theoretical framework to make sense of the case studies
presented in this project. More importantly, this literature review will strengthen my claims as to
why there is a need to research this specific topic. Afterward, the case studies of The Sony Hack,
the Qatari News Hack, and the Hong Kong National Security Law will be discussed with
graphics to guide in telling each story. For each country, a background of the case study will be
outlined, and key themes will be explored. Next, the analysis section will be broken into three
subsections: reputation as a motivator for cyber warfare, establishing political influence through
the use of technology, and the impact of the ongoing coronavirus pandemic on cybersecurity.
Finally, the conclusion will summarize the arguments discussed and outline future questions to
be researched in cybersecurity and political science.
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Limitations
The first and the most pressing limitation is that most of the sources concerning the case
studies do not focus on human weaknesses when discussing the foundations of the event. Many
cybersecurity experts only point out the fatal flaw of human error in not safeguarding their
electronic devices or security infrastructure. As stated, cybersecurity tends to be dominated by
programmers with experience only in technology and engineering, despite many cyber-attacks
having a political or social motive. This can make it difficult to recognize the real reasons behind
particular hacks, as sometimes the issue is not the security element but the action that prompts it.
Indeed, one can install and implement all the necessary security protocols, but there is not, nor
will there never be, a 100% hack-free device in this world. Data breaches are like cybersecurity’s
Kryptonite. Research that discusses the complicated relationship between cybersecurity,
international relations, and political science does not yet seem to be a major focus in the field. I
hope to shed more light on conflict in cyberspace and offer speculation as to how to improve the
cybersecurity environment in the future.
This research refers to digital censorship, disinformation, and political propaganda. It is
possible that I have not uncovered all parts of my case studies if any material was concealed
from the public domain. Certain countries with state-run media, such as North Korea and the
UAE, have different reporting frameworks than independent media outlets. Adding to my
previous statement, another limitation of this thesis is that some of the cited sources were
pro-Western. For example, one of the books that I mainly used in this research is Adam Segal’s
book A Hacked World Order. Segal does an excellent job at laying out the relationship between
geopolitics and international relations but spends a good majority of his book critiquing the lack
of freedom of digital privacy in non-democratic regimes. Due to the limited time to complete this
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thesis, I cannot go into depth on the regime types of each of my case studies. It would be
interesting if I were to examine how regime type influences the use of cyber tools, as the three
countries in this study score “low” on the Freedom Index.
My last limitation of this project is that these case studies are relatively recent and still
developing. The books and research journals I found provide broad ideas of cyber warfare as it
continues to evolve. The Hong Kong National Security Law is so recent from the completion of
this thesis that most of the sources I could use for these two case studies are blog posts and news
reports. Additionally, it was just reported as of December 2020 that there are talks of resolving
the Gulf crisis with Qatar. I am hopeful that over time, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic,
more works may be published on these subjects as they are still ongoing and relevant to today.
In an increasingly competitive international landscape, cybersecurity becomes harder to
manage as nation-states continue to use technology for political gain. Comparisons in the cyber
field are imperfect because each nation-state has its own idea of what is acceptable, which may
lead to variations in international norms. Cybersecurity is often perceived as an alternative form
of warfare––with the possible exception of the U.S. and China––but not a main strategic actor in
international relations. This project aims to bring awareness to the great potential that
cybersecurity will have, and has had already, in an increasingly digital world.
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Literature Review
Contribution to Scholarship
The purpose of the literature review is to position my work in relation to what others have
already done, specifically Nazli Chocuri’s “Cyberpolitics in International Relations,” Adam
Segal’s “Hacked World Order,” and Fabio Rugge’s chapter in “Confronting an Axis of Cyber,”
“An Axis Reloaded?” As there is minimal research on the intersection of political science and
cyberspace, I will draw my conclusions to how cybersecurity and politics intersect with the help
of few trusted scholarly sources. Building upon previous research, I collected data on each of
these books and analyzed how each author’s framework connects to my own research. I aim to
contribute to the discussion of cyberspace conflict in international relations while demonstrating
that my research addresses a gap in analyzing human behavior in cybersecurity.

Nazli Chocuri’s “Cyberpolitics in International Relations”
Nazli Chocuri’s book “Cyberpolitics in International Relations” explores cyberspace as a
new competition field in the international landscape, one that transcends traditional territorial,
governmental, social, and economic constraints of conventional or militarized warfare.1 Chocuri
is an expert in international relations and cyberpolitics; in this book, she pays special attention to
the transformation in the cyber domain and the rise of digital technology. She discusses how this
understanding crosses into political science, power, and influence.
Cyberpolitics, a recently coined term, refers to the conjunction of two processes or realities — those pertaining to
human interactions (politics) surrounding the determination of who gets what, when, and how, and those enabled by
the uses of a virtual space (cyber) as a new arena of contention with its own modalities and realities.

1

Nazli Chocuri, “Cyberpolitics in International Relations,” 6.
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The seven characteristics that Chocuri lays out in her book help to define the
development of cybersecurity and growing opportunities for competition and conflict, which are
crucial elements to politics and the pursuit of power. In recent years, what was initially
considered a neutral sphere of open interaction––created by technological advancements flowing
mainly from the West––is a tool of influence.
All three case studies connect to Chocuri’s Table of Characteristics in different ways. In
my first case study that discusses North Korea and the Sony Hack––a prime example of political
coercion––physicality, fluidity, and accountability allow North Korea to execute its extensive
hack on Sony Pictures in response to Sony’s intended release of “The Interview,” a film that
critiques and mocks the North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un. North Korea is granted a
significant advantage when carrying out offensive attacks, but this is not just because the hack
was attributed to a shadow hacker group and not the North Korean government directly. North
Korea’s distant geographical location from its adversaries, in conjunction with the lack of
communication technology within the civilian population, make it much easier for them to
bypass mechanisms of responsibility and deny allegations made against them. In many ways, the
physicality element of cyberspace is a defining characteristic of the Sony Pictures Hack.
The initial goal of Project Raven in the UAE was to monitor any malicious activity, such
as terrorism, against the Emirati government. Today it is best known as a confidential initiative
to surveil and spy on regional opponents. My second case study concerning the Emirati
government’s Project attack on Qatar ties into Chocuri’s characteristics attribution, fluidity, and
instantaneity. When the UAE hacked into the Qatari News Agency’s website and planted
evidence that Qatar’s emir was in support of Iran, this prompted an instant response from the rest
of the Gulf states to blockade Qatar. The Gulf’s regional politics shifted beyond what the Arab
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Spring did in ways that disrupted Middle Eastern security, redefined state sovereignty, and
stirred chaos in the region. After Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain first imposed diplomatic
blockades on Qatar, Project Raven ramped up its cyber-attacks against Qatar and its media
targets2 but claimed no responsibility for the attack that helped spark the ongoing Gulf Crisis.
Hong Kong is in a unique position because it is a semi autonomous island that is
connected to China under a “one state, two system” philosophy. Tying back to Chocuri’s Tables
of Characteristics of cyberspace, permeation and participation can be seen in this case study.
Permeation is a clear characteristic to the Hong Kong case as social media has become a
battleground in Hong Kong’s protests, enabling activists to spread word to the rest of the world
about China’s anti-democratic infiltration into the region. Social and digital media in Hong Kong
is being used to enhance participation in activism against the Chinese Communist Party, though
the use of technology on China’s part has censored this online activism in cyberspace.

Adam Segal’s “The Hacked World Order”
Politics is about exerting influence and control to gain advantage. The Internet is a crucial
part to the emerging global communications infrastructure, which enables actors to use digital
technology for carrying out political agendas. Adam Segal identifies technology as a new form
of warfare, noting that even private companies are at the forefront of cyberspace. Out of the three
case studies, Segal’s book only mentions the Sony Pictures hack of 2014. In “The Hacked World
Order,” Segal classifies the Sony Hack as “a narrative thriller and parable”3 attributing North
Korea’s success on their geographic location and lack of communication technologies within the
country. Segal identifies that because of the U.S. underestimating North Korea’s offensive and
2
3

Schetman and Bing, “Former NSA spies hacked BBC host, Al Jazeera chairman for UAE.”
Adam Segal, “Hacked World Order,” 62.
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defense cyber capabilities, the issue dragged on longer than it should have. As the Sony Pictures
hack gradually unfolded during the week of Thanksgiving of 2014 and into December, North
Korea became a forefront figure in international cyberspace. The Sony Hack was bold and
daring, to say the least. One of the elements to cyber power that Segal identifies is
“rapaciousness,”4 which North Korea possesses. However, the attack was not meant to advance
economic interest. Rather, the main motive was to embarrass and hurt Sony Pictures
Entertainment from afar.
For a cyber-attack on a private corporation to receive worldwide media attention was
particularly rare and alarming for that time. When Sony officially canceled the movie release of
“The Interview,” this prompted a direct response from former President Obama. He stated that it
was wrong for Sony to back down because the attack undermined U.S. values of “freedom of
expression” and national security. Segal notes that, had Sony not withdrawn the movie,
Washington likely would not have made an official response against the attack, and the hack
would not have been as unique. Information Security expert Mathew Schwartz also echoes the
sentiment that pulling “The Interview” was exactly the wrong thing to do, since there was no
credibility to the Guardians of Peace’s threat. “It’s the kind of response you get when you don’t
have a plan.”5 Instead, Sony’s response only empowered the hackers to go a step further.

Fabio Rugge’s “An ‘Axis’ Reloaded?”
A great challenge of cybersecurity is attributing cybercrime to a specific person or group,
especially when it comes to state-sponsored hacks. Cyber-attacks allow high-ranking officials in
government as well as intelligence agencies to masquerade as common cybercriminals. In other

4
5

Adam Segal, “Hacked World Order,” 42-43.
Schwartz, “Sony's 7 Breach Response Mistakes.”
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words, it is difficult to figure out who is really behind a virtual attack. Fabio Rugge writes the
introductory chapter titled “An Axis’ Reloaded?” in the book “Confronting an Axis of Cyber” on
cyberspace behavior, values, norms. He highlights that the current confrontation in cyberspace is
translating, at the international level, into a massive “security paradox.” This is because cyber
strategies differ by state and are sometimes perceived as aggressive or offensive, or the results of
using such technologies can have detrimental effects in real world politics.
Defining rules and international cyber laws for a state’s cyber behavior is an absolute
priority, especially when it comes to the use of force and coercion in cyberspace. This suggestion
is brought up by Rugge, arguing that that the low level of public awareness of cyber-enabled
information warfare (CEIW) is “understandable but worrisome.”6 He discusses the 2016 U.S.
Presidential Election as an example; when Russia meddled in the 2016 Presidential elections’
debate, the massive data leaks catalyzed a DNC scandal that eroded trust in American
institutions. However, despite the hack’s severity in altering the course of American politics, it
still failed to raise the public’s understanding of “the true nature of cyber threats and of the
potential impact on international security.” 7 This is because cyberspace is the “domain of
ambiguity,” where it is impossible to anticipate the scope of a virtual campaign without
considering strategic, political, or social contexts.
Rugge marks 2008 as a critical year, where the first use of cyber-attacks in military
operations were used during the Georgian War. Since then, various cyber-attacks have been
carried out in the ongoing presence of international crises. The Qatari News Hack––a case study
in this thesis– is mentioned as one of these cyber-attacks; the ongoing Gulf dispute in the Middle
East quickly escalated after the alleged false statements from the UAE were planted on the
6

Cyber-enabled information warfare describes the overlap of cyberspace into traditional and conventional strategic
warfare and operations.
7
Fabio Rugge, “Confronting an Axis of Cyber?”, 14.
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Qatari news website. As a result of Qatar being blockaded by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain,
and Egypt, tensions rose when Qatar ultimately sought out Iran and Turkey for assistance, the
enemies of the U.S.-led Middle Eastern coalition against the Islamic State.
Rugge’s key point is that technological innovation is transforming societies at a rapid rate
that public opinions and foreign policymakers are unable to keep up with. If we are to effectively
manage cyber challenges in the political context, then we must recognize the cyber realm and the
“real world” are growing more interconnected and what the consequences of using technology
can have.
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Case Studies
The Sony Pictures Entertainment Hack
On November 24, 2014, Sony employees who logged onto their desktops that morning
were greeted with the sound of digital gunfire and a sinister image of a red skeleton with the title
“Hacked By #GOP.” Below the title read a grim message:

We’ve already warned you, and this is just a beginning. We continue till our request be met. We’ve
obtained all your Internal data including your secrets and top secrets. If you don’t obey us, we’ll release the data to
the world. Determine what will you do till November of the 24th, 11:00 PM (GMT).

A shadow hacker group, claiming themselves as the “Guardians of Peace” (GOP), carried
out one of the most devastating cyber-attacks on an American private institution by sabotaging
the system’s computers and stealing over 100 terabytes of data using wiper malware8 and
releasing that sensitive information to the general public. Though politically motivated attacks
and theft of intellectual property are not new, this case study stands out amongst others because
it drew an unprecedented U.S. response. What was first seen as an amateur cyber hack ultimately
catalyzed a series of actions for U.S. national security.
The GOP demanded that Sony cancel its then-upcoming political satire film, “The
Interview.” The film, which stars James Franco and Seth Rogen, is about two journalists hired by
the CIA who attempt to assassinate Kim Jong-un, who is parodied by actor and comedian
Randall Park. When the film was still being made in the summer of 2014 by Columbia Pictures,
Korean officials expressed disdain over the movie as releasing such a film would constitute an
act of “the most undisguised sponsoring of terrorism as well as an act of war.” A spokesman
8

Malware is malicious software intended to infiltrate another user’s computer to leak, steal, or manipulate data.
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from the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented that “if the United States
administration tacitly approves or supports the release of this film, we will take a decisive and
merciless countermeasure.”9 The spokesman did not elaborate on this statement but noted that
Washington was guilty of “provocative insanity” and tainting the North Korean supreme leader’s
image. Pyongyang also wrote a letter of complaint to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations to stop the production. Michael Lynton, then Sony’s chief executive, said when Sony
officials called the State Department, they were told it was just more “bluster.”10
GOP hackers reportedly gained access to Sony’s networks from the inside by stealing a
key password from an employee in Sony’s IT department, likely a system administrator who had
broad access to the computer systems. The GOP’s technique of gaining the password is not
entirely certain. Still, many speculate it was shared through a spear-phishing attack, a social
engineering tactic intended to steal data. After the Sony hack was publicized later in November,
several American journalists requested comment from the GOP. One GOP member, who called
themselves “Lena,” told a CSO Magazine reporter that “Sony left their doors unlocked, and it bit
them.” Lena added that “[Sony] doesn’t do physical security anymore,”11 which made it much
easier for the GOP to plant the malware.
Although Sony’s security systems were already weak, it is clear that the Sony hack was
carefully executed and well thought out. The release of the stolen data came out gradually by
week. On November 27, three days after employees found the message on their computer
screens, five Sony films––four of which had not been released––were uploaded to an online
file-sharing hub for free streaming to the public12. Following the release of these films on

Sang-hun, “North Korea Warns U.S. Over Film Mocking Its Leader.”
Sanger, “The World Once Laughed at North Korean Cyberpower. No More.”
11
Bort, “How the Hackers Broke into Sony And Why It Could Happen to Any Company.”
12
Risk Based Security, “A Breakdown and Analysis of the December, 2014 Sony Hack."
9

10
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December 1, the pre-bonus salaries of Sony’s top 17 executives were leaked, as well as personal
information of more than 47,000 former and current Sony employees. The information
uncovered from the data itself caused major upset as the numbers indicated a sizable gender pay
gap between male and female employees and actors. Sony hired the FBI’s cybersecurity firm,
SealMandiant, to investigate, but stolen data––from celebrity aliases, Sony workplace
complaints, to passport and visa information––was still being released day by day in batches.
On December 5, the GOP emailed Sony employees threatening to harm them and their
families if they did not sign a statement renouncing the company. As word of this message got
out to the public media, people began to panic. Despite the paranoia, however, it should be
understood that the length of the Sony Hack can be attributed to the poor responses. James
Franco, who hosted Saturday Night Live the night after the threat, mocked the hackers in an
opening monologue:

Something pretty crazy happened this week. I have this movie called ‘The Interview’ coming out at Sony
and this week Sony Studios got all their computers hacked. This is true. These hackers have leaked real personal
information about everybody that works at Sony. Social security numbers, e-mails, and I know eventually they’re
going to start leaking out stuff about me. So, before you hear it from someone else, I thought it would be better if
you hear it from me. Soon you’ll know that my e-mail is CuterThanDaveFranco@AOL.com. My password is
‘LittleJamesyCutiePie’ — and this is all just a real violation of my personal life.

The Christmas release of “The Interview” was canceled, following another email sent on
December 16, 2014 from the GOP that contained terroristic threats. “The world will be full of
fear. Remember the 11th of September 2001. We recommend you to keep yourself distant from
the [theaters] at the time. (If your house is nearby, you’d better leave).” While many thought that
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it was a relief to pull the plug on the movie premiere, others, specifically President Barack
Obama, were disappointed that Sony listened to the GOP’s commands. “I’m sympathetic to the
concerns they faced. Having said all that, I think they made a mistake.”13
On December 19, 2014, the FBI’s cybersecurity firm, SealMandiant, linked14 the Sony
Hack to North Korea. Though they claimed they could not share all details concerning the report
for confidential reasons, they laid out three points asserting their argument: (1) Technical
analysis of the data deletion malware was linked to other malwares that the FBI can confirm
were used by North Korea; (2) The IP addresses15 were associated with North Korean
infrastructure; (3) The tools used in the hack were similar to the South Korean bank and media
hacks made by North Korea in March of 2014. Although the North Korean government
continually denied the allegations that they were behind the attack, the U.S. Department of the
Treasury imposed economic sanctions on North Korea in January of 2015, which further
intensified tension between the U.S. and North Korea.
The severity of the hack was not realized at first. As Buchanan puts it, “Sony executives
apparently talked to United States officials after the North Korean saber-rattling, but neither side
seemed overly concerned about the possibility of North Korean escalation.”16 The BBC also
quotes a tech expert wrongly predicting that the Sony hack would be less detrimental than the
2011 hack on Sony’s PlayStation. Wee Teck Loo, head of consumer electronics research at
Euromonitor, told the BBC: “This time around, I don’t believe that there will be massive
damage, save for Sony’s ego, even if the hack is real.” While there was clear significant financial
loss to the studio, what made the breach so catastrophic wasn’t the hack itself but the series of
13

Diamond, “Washington Outraged Over Sony Decision.”
Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Update on Sony Investigation”
15
IP address stands for Internet Protocol address, which is a numerical label associated with a computer that
identifies a user on the Internet.
16
Ben Buchanan, “The Hacker and the State,” 167.
14
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events that unfolded. The breach of confidentiality and failure to secure information led to
dozens of lawsuits against Sony Pictures. Below is a graph that demonstrates the data leaks and
the data destruction were the two most damaging aspects.
The embarrassing secrets and of a successful multibillion-dollar entertainment company
were exposed, which led to financial and legal issues that lasted for years. As the focus of the
attack was centered on the public gossip about the film industry, the Sony Hack became a
worldwide phenomenon. Backlash was particularly directed towards Sony producer Scott Rudin,
when emails exchanges between Rudin and co-chair of Sony Amy Pascal were released. In the
emails, Rudin described famous actress and activist Angelina Jolie as a “minimally talented
spoiled little brat” after Jolie wanted David Fincher to direct Jolie’s film, “Cleopatra”. “YOU
BETTER SHUT ANGIE DOWN BEFORE SHE MAKES IT VERY HARD FOR DAVID TO
DO JOBS,” Rudin said in one email, referring to Jolie.17 Rudin also took aim at actress Megan
Ellison when he referred to Ellison as a “bipolar 28-year old lunatic” who needed to take her
meds. The Sony hack also showed emails disclosing racially insensitive remarks against former
President Barack Obama, which caused mass criticism from high-profile celebrities like Kevin
Hart and Shonda Rhimes. Pascal––while discussing breakfast at which she would be meeting
President Obama––jokingly asked18 Rudin if Obama likes the movies “DJANGO” and “The
Butler,” two movies centered around black men.
The Sony Hack was the start of an era where digital technologies became a choice of
weapon for political coercion. Given the relative weakness of its military, and its distant
geography from its Western adversaries, North Korea chose to instigate and carry out irregular
cyber operations as part of their strategic objectives to steal data. “While we have yet to witness

17
18

Stedman, “Leaked Sony Emails Reveal Nasty Exchanges and Insults.”
Holpuch, “Sony Email Hack: What We’ve Learned about Greed, Racism, and Sexism.”
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the extremes of cyberwar, the more subtle danger since 2016 is the way states like Russia and
North Korea use cyber-strategies as a form of political warfare.”19 When cyberwar becomes the
normal state of affairs on the Internet, states must determine what the proper response to these
attacks are since they are virtual and not physical. For the U.S. to retaliate in any way to a
cybersecurity breach on a private institution is alarming and can be traced back to a merge
between the cyber realm and the physical realm.
In hindsight, the Sony Pictures Hack demonstrated that some of the most aggressive
cyber attacks were not driven by military, security, or financial motive but by an intent to coerce
another power into doing what they want. The relative easiness and inexpensiveness of
technology has helped in aiding this process. “You don’t need that much money to invest in
cyber warfare,” says Martin Libicki, senior management scientist with the Rand Corporation. “It
is really a people thing, not a money thing,” he adds.20 North Korea only has a small GDP and a
thousand or so specialists dedicated to cyber warfare. Cyber-attacks are easier to perpetrate and
send messages. The aftermath of the data breach left us with chilling concerns about the
long-cherished right to free speech, and whether that right would have its consequences. The
breach was a turning point in cyber that even a renowned global entertainment corporation could
be the victim of a cyber-attack.

Qatari News Agency Hack
In the Sony Hack case study, I examined how cyber tools are used for (political)
coercion. In this second case study, I will look at the use of Project Raven in the UAE’s hack of

19
20

Valeriano, et.al., “Analysis: Cyberwarfare Has Taken a New Turn. Yes, It’s Time to Worry.”
Suciu, “Why Cyber Warfare Is So Attractive to Small Nations.”
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the Qatari News Agency. This case study primarily demonstrates how cyber tools are used to
spread disinformation21 and conduct espionage on state adversaries.
When news broke that the Qatari emir vocalized support for Iran and the Islamic state, it
caused a frenzy in the Middle East. On May 24 of 2017, a post was found on the Qatari News
Agency (QNA) website, Qatar’s official government media outlet, with a statement claiming to
be attributed to the Qatari Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. The statement, officially
calling Iran an Islamic power and speaking positively about the Palestinian militant group,
Hamas, was allegedly planted by hackers from the United Arab Emirates. The “fake news” that
was posted in this state-sponsored hack whipped anger against its smaller Gulf neighbors and
catalyzed an ongoing Gulf Crisis. The hack occurred just three days after President Donald J.
Trump visited Riyadh during his tour of the Middle East.
On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and the UAE cut all diplomatic and
transport ties with Qatar, accusing the state of financing Islamist militant groups, supporting
terrorism, and allying with its Shiite rival, Iran––the Gulf states’ regional adversary. The Qatari
government said its emir had never given the statement and that QNA was hacked. Despite
Qatar’s protests, its neighbors––already suspicious of Qatar for supporting terrorism––quickly
acted by blocking Qatar from the rest of the Gulf. When ties were officially severed, the
blockading countries demanded Qatar to call back all diplomats and cancel all means of
transportation, communication, and trade with them. The reports about the alleged statement
were broadcasted all over Saudi Arabian government outlets. Additionally, the UAE shut down
all Qatari media broadcasts inside its borders, including Al Jazeera, the most-watched satellite
network in the Arab region. The day after diplomatic relations in the Gulf were severed, U.S.
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Defense Secretary Jim Mattis called for negotiations between the Gulf states to resolve the
situation, however this was not successful.
On July 16, 2017, the Washington Post released an article asserting that the UAE was
responsible for orchestrating the hacking of QNA and attributing the false statement to the Qatari
emir.22 U.S. intelligence agencies, including the FBI and the CIA, and British law enforcement
officials found that members of the Emirati government discussed the disinformation plan and its
implementation with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Yousef al-Otaiba, the UAE Ambassador to the
United States, stated to the Post that the article was false. “The UAE had no role whatsoever in
the alleged hacking described in the article,” the statement said. “What is true is Qatar’s
behavior. Funding, supporting, and enabling extremists from the Taliban to Hamas and Qadafi.
Inciting violence, encouraging radicalization, and undermining the stability of its neighbors.”23
In a separate Reuters report, investigators uncovered that Project Raven operatives sprang
quickly into action and launched operations to break into the Apple iPhones of at least ten
journalists and media executives they believed were colluding with Qatar or the Muslim
Brotherhood. “The goal, the former Raven operatives said, was to find material showing that
Qatar’s royal family had influenced the coverage of Al Jazeera and other media outlets, and
uncover any ties between the influential TV network and the Muslim Brotherhood.”24 BBC host
Giselle Khoury, the chairman of Al Jazeera, Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani, and other prominent
Arab media figures were reportedly spied on by Raven operatives. The UAE’s security officials
used a surveillance tool called Karma to surveil and steal information from the intended targets.
Karma was dangerous because hackers could obtain personal information by uploading phone
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numbers or email accounts into an automated targeting system. The UAE purchased Karma from
an unknown source.
The UAE and Qatar have been engaged in a “tit-for-tat hack-and-leak”25 operation for
years. Tensions between the UAE and Qatar can be traced back to 2013 during a power struggle
in Egypt. When Qatar allied with the Egyptian Islamist movement after the Arab Spring, the
UAE backed a military takeover that cast the Islamists into prison. Each side has been accusing
the other of cyber espionage for years, leading to multiple lawsuits and strained Gulf relations.
Perhaps the UAE and its allies needed to find a legitimate reason to cut ties with Qatar and were
willing to plant false information to carry this out. A few months after the rift began, U.S.
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson intervened to stop Saudi Arabia and the UAE from invading
Qatar militarily.26 Though the U.S. is allied with the blockading countries, it has strong relations
with Qatar.
The UAE hack on Qatar signaled a broader transformation in cyber espionage. It is a
clear sign that cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns are no longer the exclusive domain of
sophisticated powers of Russia, China, and the U.S. Like North Korea and the Sony Hack,
cyber-attacks are no longer limited to Western or first-world countries because technology is
becoming more accessible and affordable as the digital era becomes more present in everyday
life. The rapid advancement of this technology creates an increasingly competitive cyberspace
where small states such as the United Arab Emirates hold power to sway Middle Eastern politics
to the point where the U.S. steps in to mediate. Many small states, especially in areas where
hiring hackers is easy, find that cyber war provides a greater return than actual investment in
conventional weapons. Amy Chang, a research associate in the technology and national security
25
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program at the Center for New American Security, states that cyber warfare is an excellent
alternative to conventional weapons because it is cheaper and far more accessible, especially for
small nation-states. Essentially, it allows these countries to pull off attacks without the risk of
retaliation or getting caught.27
This news hack is not the first time where the UAE attempted to meddle in other state’s
affairs. In 2016, Reuters uncovered documents that revealed that the UAE had been using cyber
tools to monitor other targets aside from the Qatari emir. These included a senior Turkish official
Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek, Oman’s head of foreign affairs Yusuf bin Alawi bin
Abdullah, the Saudi Prince, and even American citizens from abroad. Ex-NSA Lori Stroud
confirmed as a former Project Raven operative that foreign adversaries such as Iran, Qatar,
Turkey, and individuals who criticized the monarchy, were the main targets.28 According to
documents reviewed by Reuters, Raven was largely staffed by U.S. intelligence community
veterans who were paid through an Emirati cybersecurity firm named DarkMatter.29 DarkMatter
did not respond to the numerous emails and phone calls requesting comment. The NSA also
declined to comment on Project Raven.30
Besides Israel, the UAE has developed a reputation as a tech hub in the Arab world,
attracting investments in computing from large tech corporations such as Microsoft. The UAE is
a prime example of how Gulf monarchies are increasingly outsourcing defense and security
work. The fact that the UAE was able to garner support from former NSA methods, knowledge,
and tools for use by their own intelligence purposes is alarming. The UAE also recruited
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graduates of the Israeli military’s cyber unit, offering lavish salaries and properties to the
individuals.
The Qatari News Hack case study demonstrates the power of disinformation. The Emirati
government’s use of cyber technology enabled them to sanction off and isolate Qatar from the
rest of the Gulf states. The planting of fake statements engineered what would be one of the
greatest modern Gulf crisis. “The Emiratis needed a trigger to spark the crisis and this was it.”31
A hack of the QNA is also a striking example of a cyber-attack in shaping Middle Eastern
politics. The UAE readily denies the allegations that they attacked the Qatari news site to this
day, despite evidence that the Emirati government has been spying on Qatar since 2016 and had
prior political tensions dating back to the formation of Al Jazeera.

Hong Kong National Security Law
The Sony Hack and Qatari News Hack case studies were examples of security breaches.
They examined how technology and digital media enable small powers to sway domestic and
international politics through hacking. It was clear who the perpetrators of the hack were and
who the victims were. In this third case study, I will examine Hong Kong’s national security law
to discuss how the People’s Republic of China uses cyber technology to carry out political and
economic initiatives over Hong Kong through censorship and surveillance.
In 1984, thirteen years before the handover of Hong Kong, China and Britain signed a
treaty that declared China and Hong Kong would be under the principle of “one country, two
systems,” otherwise known officially as the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984. Since the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China’s (HKSAR)
handover from British rule in 1997, they thrived under the authority of China but in a “one
31
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country, two system” concept that was implemented in Basic Law, Hong Kong’s de-facto
establishment. The declaration enshrined the city’s capitalist system and granted it a high degree
of autonomy. It also helps them to reintegrate Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau with mainland
China while preserving their own political and economic systems.32 During this time, Hong
Kong had been trying for years to pass a security law; it was unsuccessful due to an inability to
reach a consensus. However, the semi autonomous region’s standing as a stable international
financial center and gateway for global capital has risen above China, making it a populous city
for multinational corporations and foreign investors.
On June 30, 2020, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress
imposed a security law at 11:00 PM, just an hour before the 23rd anniversary of the city’s
handover to China from the British. With little input from local Hong Kong officials, this new
security law established a wide-reaching security apparatus with the power to crack down on a
range of political actions deemed harmful to the Chinese government and the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). The law is now incorporated into Hong Kong’s “mini-constitution,” the
Basic Law, but the details of the law’s sixty-six articles were not revealed until after it was
passed. The Hong Kong democracy campaigner Joshua Wong spoke out in a series of tweets33
after his political party, Demosisto, was disbanding:

[The security law] marks the end of Hong Kong that the world knew before. From now on, #HongKong enters a
new era of terror, just like #Taiwan’s White Terror period in history, with arbitrary prosecutions, black jails, secret
trials, forced confessions, media clampdowns and political censorship. With sweeping powers and ill-defined law,
the city will turn into a #secretpolicestate.
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The new Hong Kong law criminalizes secession, subversion, terrorism, or collusion with
foreign forces with maximum life sentences in prison, resembling mainland China’s own laws.
Both Chinese and Hong Kong laws include punishments for people “suspected” of inciting
hatred against the government, with no elaboration. Roger Creemers of Leiden University in the
Netherlands says that “vagueness is a governing tactic”34 for China’s authoritarian regime. Strict
punishments, which acted as a deterrent, are core to China’s control over Hong Kong.
Beijing will establish a new security office in Hong Kong with its own Chinese law enforcement
personnel. Under the new law, Chinese officials can arrest any protestor and sentence them to
life and without bail. Additionally, the law would allow for new Chinese national security
agencies and formal secret police authority. Hong Kong can establish its own national security
commission but with a Beijing-appointed advisor. The city has long cherished the independent
judiciary, a remnant of the British colonial rule that stood in stark contrast to China’s secretive,
party-controlled courts. Now, Hong Kong must address its cases according to mainland Chinese
law, where the penalties for violation are often harsh. There are now questions as to whether
Hong Kong will be permanently stripped of free speech and public communication.
Hong Kong’s civil unrest began when talk of plans––which did not end up
happening––that would allow extradition from Hong Kong to mainland China had spread to the
public. What started as a single peaceful demonstration has snowballed into a wider
pro-democracy movement, demanding state autonomy and self-rule. The urge to push for
democratic reform and investigate alleged cases of police brutality followed through city-wide
protests which, in turn, sparked mass upheaval for a fight to protect democratic institutions. Last
year in 2019, anti-government demonstrators in Hong Kong bombarded police stations and
surrounded Chinese government buildings. Some Hong Kong protesters have called upon the
34
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U.S. in their support for democracy and freedom by waving American flags to symbolize
pro-democracy and free speech. A stronger pro-democracy protest presence would also empower
the U.S. government to impose sanctions on Chinese or Hong Kong officials deemed to be
undermining that autonomy or committing human rights abuses.
On May 22, 2020, an explanation of the National People’s Congress’ (NPCSC) request
for authorization to create new national security legislation for Hong Kong was released. NPC
Vice Chairman Wang Chen cited growing risks to China’s national security in the city since the
outbreak of the anti-extradition bill protests in June 2019. Wang stated that the forces that were
“anti-China” were calling for Hong Kong’s independence from China, self-determination, and
for a referendum on Hong Kong’s future.35 When explaining China’s decision to establish a
national security law, he accused that the protesters:
…openly insulted and defaced the national flag and emblem, incited Hong Kong people to be anti-China and
anti-Communist Party, besieged the Central People’s Government’s institutions stationed in Hong Kong,
discriminated against and excluded people from mainland China in Hong Kong; deliberately undermined social
order in Hong Kong, violently confronted police enforcing the law, damaged public facilities and public property,
and paralyzed the governance of the government and the operation of the Legislative Council.

The Hong Kong national security law raises questions as to how China is using cyber
technology to censor and surveil Hong Kong, as well as how technology might be used to sway
Chinese politics. Many are afraid that Hong Kong’s judicial independence will be trampled and
that the city’s legal system will soon resemble one of China’s, one with no right to free
expression. “It is clear that the law will have a severe impact on freedom of expression, if not
personal security, on the people of Hong Kong,” notes Professor Johannes Chan, a legal scholar
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at the University of Hong Kong.36 The law blurs the line between software developed for
national security and for individual or personal use.
Donald Trump and the White House did not say too much on the new Hong Kong law,
but there have been actions to address it. On November 22, President Trump made a comment on
“Fox & Friends” where he signaled support of the protestors but also pointed out his trade deal
with China. In fact, Trump also spoke warmly about Xi, calling him “an incredible guy” and “a
friend of mine,” 37 while also crediting his trade negotiation as the reason why Hong Kong was
not already obliterated. Eventually, on November 28, 2019, Trump signed the Hong Kong
Human Rights and Democracy bill, which requires the U.S. government to impose sanctions
against mainland China and Hong Kong officials responsible for human rights abuses against
protestors. The bill received bipartisan support in the Senate and the House of
Representatives––signaling support for self-determination in Hong Kong. In the eyes of the
Trump administration, the Hong Kong matter is a second-tier issue compared to trade with China
and North Korean and Iranian nuclear threats. However, China has and continues to repeatedly
blame the protestors on foreign interference in the city.38 In an indirect way, this case study
exemplifies China’s attack on Western ideology.
Hong Kong’s protesters are using their available tools to bring heightened awareness not
just to cybersecurity but to Chinese-Hong Kong relations. This has allowed us to recognize how
unique and so far-fetched in that the law can apply to anyone, anywhere in the world. The law’s
expansive scope will especially make it difficult for data and tech companies to conduct
business. Donald Clarke, a law professor at the George Washington University, noted that the
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law claims “extraterritorial jurisdiction” over every person on the planet.39 Essentially, the law is
broader in scope than China’s own criminal law. So, how willing are technology and financial
platforms to stand up to the Chinese government, particularly when their assets are at stake?
Companies like Google and Facebook halted accepting requests for data from Hong Kong
authorities, while TikTok, a Chinese-owned platform, has already decided to entirely pull out of
the region. “If companies like Google and Facebook refuse to comply, they could be fined
thousands of dollars, and their local employees may be sent to prison for up to six months.”40
Since the rules also extend beyond Hong Kong’s borders, Facebook could be compelled to
produce information about a user in the U.S. if Hong Kong authorities deemed their posts a
threat to China’s national security.
While China uses its resources to keep eyes on the citizens of Hong Kong, citizens in
Hong Kong are fighting back by using technology to galvanize international support, hide
organizer’s identities, and mobilize demonstrations. In a CNBC article, Tracy Loh, senior
lecturer of communication management at Singapore Management University, stated: “what has
changed now is that social media is used to win the hearts and minds of the people. Both sides
are using images of police brutality and/or protester brutality to further their own agendas.”41
The case study of Hong Kong asks a crucial question: what is the balance between
individual rights and state interests in the digital age? Looking at the consequences of this new
law, the latter seems to outweigh the former. The use of digital technology to suppress and
control flow of information is a common theme throughout Chinese cyber realm. Enforcing the
2017 Chinese Cybersecurity Law onto Hong Kong would be illegitimate; however, this law––in
addition to many others related to digital technology–– could be slowly introduced by starting
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with access to data, security and localization requirements for citizens’ and organizations’ data,
and critical infrastructure protection measures. When President Xi assumed the presidency, he
focused on consolidating his power through an anti-corruption campaign that would continue to
this day. As more people had access to the Internet in China. Xi responded by creating small
interest groups dedicated to cybersecurity policy issues, a key instrument for Xi to exercise
greater control over the huge Chinese bureaucracy.
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Discussion and Analysis
The discussion and analysis portion of my thesis will offer speculations and suggestions
for each of the case studies. In conducting research for this thesis, I would like to argue how
much International Studies has to offer; not just to the computer science and cybersecurity fields
but to all academic disciplines. International Studies offers a new way of critical thinking. The
application of the International Studies lens to cybersecurity allows one to take a step back to see
a bigger picture, which, in turn, can unveil the true nature of modern cyber challenges.

International Studies Interdisciplinary Table

Economics

History

Sociology

Political
Science

Your Reputation Precedes You
Max Weber defined power as the chances that an individual in a social relationship can
achieve their own will in spite of resistance.42 Those with limited or diminishing power may act
to gain control over certain resources. Weber’s theory certainly applies to this thesis as power
and reputation were the driving forces in each case study examined. I argue that aside from
proper practice, one should consider the reputational risks which come from two essential
factors: the speaker and the status. One must also consider the consequences that can follow from
the use of technology in the context of societal engagement and public engagement. North
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Korea’s rage against Sony was caused by Sony’s intention to tarnish North Korea’s image as a
country not to be messed with. The wrong thing to do was to make a movie mocking North
Korea in the first place. The Kim family’s cult of personality, which only began after Kim
II-sung took power in 1948, shows this; if one does not show “proper” respect for the regime,
there would be consequences. In regards to the UAE case study, demonstrates the extent to
which the UAE, alongside Saudi Arabia, were unwilling to tolerate any deviation from its vision
for this region and the lengths to which they would go to. After the election of former U.S.
President Donald Trump, the UAE likely saw the new American presidency as an opportunity to
start asserting power in the Middle East. With the momentum of paranoia and panic in the Gulf,
it started the hashtag trend “اﻟﻘﻄﻊ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻘﺎت ﻣﻊ ﻗﺘﺮ,” or “cut relations with Qatar,” bringing more
attention to Qatar’s fake statement. Similar to the UAE, China wanted to maintain a secure grasp
of their domestic security, and the way to do this was through a security law that would limit any
anti-government protest. With the overthrow of the Qings in 1912 and the Chinese Civil War, the
Chinese are especially keen on keeping control of the population.
North Korea, the UAE, and China all share a characteristic of going to great lengths to
maintain their reputation from foreign adversaries. North Korea’s method was coercion; the
UAE employed a disinformation tactic; and China used digital surveillance and oppression on
the semi autonomous region of Hong Kong. All three countries used cybersecurity tools as a
means for political purpose which, in turn, has created a new and murkier cyberspace. Based on
the findings of this research, I conclude that cybersecurity must be viewed holistically or with an
interdisciplinary lens outside of computer science for solving issues that cannot be solved with a
simple code. Cybersecurity is only perceived as a technical field that is dominated by computer
scientists and engineers with limited knowledge of public culture or social dynamics. The
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hackers and spies behind the cyber tools learn to adapt and improve their techniques for the
future, so it is important to understand where the root causes for cyber conflict are coming from.

Controlling the Media Narrative
In the 1930s, the U.S. welcomed the radio, which quickly became a golden phenomenon.
By the start of World War II during 1939, nearly 28 million American households owned radios
to receive their news. Eventually, this shifted when the 1960s and 1970s ushered in a new era of
digital technology. Both technologies had such large attraction because it was an excellent way
of uniting communities, especially during WWII, The Cold War, and the Vietnam War. What
should be noted from this is that people could only really receive their news in one form; unlike
today, where we can choose where we get our information from, the spectacle of news was pretty
uniform. In “Confronting an Axis of Cyber” James Lewis’ chapter “Defining Rules of Behavior
for Force and Coercion in Cyberspace” states part of the reason why it was easier for
nation-states to come together in earlier times was because the world was recovering from
various world wars that overwhelmed the international system. “This is not 1945 when there was
widespread consensus on the need for stabilising institutions, nor is it 1975, when Cold War
opponents were ready to reach accommodations to increase stability.”43
The technological advancements in the 40 years between the 1930s and the 1970s is
astonishingly different from those between the 1970s and the 2010s. Today, anyone with a
device has the ability to control “the minds of the masses,” in the words of Malcom X. Media
scholars classify the press as “the fourth estate” 44 exemplifying the considerable influence that
the press had on public affairs. In England, this term was first used in Parliament as a group to be
43
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added alongside the nobility, the clergy, and the commoners. Essentially, what makes the
Internet so unique in this case is that online processes functioned as a mode for narrative control,
which differs from conventional or military warfare in that it is much more abstract.
The idea that media is one of the most potent entities proves absolutely true in this thesis.
Seeing Sony suffer horribly while controlling what the world saw was far more rewarding for
North Korea than hacking the multinational entertainment corporation itself. North Korea's goal
of preventing the movie from being shown had not followed as planned, but the hack's outcome
almost certainly exceeded their expectations. The same can be said for the UAE and the planting
of statements on the Qatari News Agency’s website. The UAE case study shows us a declining
hierarchy of knowledge; one message brought an entire region into chaos, unveiling the
underlying issues that the Middle Eastern already had in the Gulf coast. With the Sony Hack and
Project Raven, these examples show that cyberspace allows diplomats and state governments to
masquerade as cybercriminals. Lastly, Hong Kong’s use of technology, both on the protestor and
the police force side, is the best example of technology being used to narrate the battle for public
opinion. The Internet has become a token of political geography where online participation was
crucial to the success of the Hong Kong protests. China's live news feeds, action information,
and “intelligence” collected through cybersecurity surveillance have also shown us China’s
attempts to uphold societal discipline and unity.

COVID-19 Pandemic and Moving Forward
This year, the world navigated the stress and devastation of a deadly COVID-19
pandemic. The pandemic inevitably interrupted a normal way of life and led to months of
lockdown in all fifty U.S. states. As we continue to stay at home and limit ourselves from large
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social gatherings and other grand events, the use of communication platforms, such as Zoom and
Google Hangouts, has risen exponentially. COVID-19 has also contributed to e-commerce with
the adoption of online shopping and increased social media usage. With a greater reliance on
digital technology to conduct everyday tasks, we have also become increasingly vulnerable to
cybercrime.
Cybersecurity threats are estimated to double from $3 trillion to $6 trillion (USD) a year
by 2021, and the number of cyber-attacks has increased five times worldwide after the
COVID-19 outbreak.45 With the heightened emotional states, individuals are more susceptible to
falling for email scams such as ransomware attacks and phishing scams. On a much larger scale,
there have been multiple cases of cyber hacks from Russia and China on the U.S.’s COVID-19
research. The pandemic has ultimately created a new set of practices in cyberspace, both
domestically and internationally, which will ultimately have an impact on the ongoing Gulf
Crisis and Hong Kong Security Law.
Out of all the three case studies, the COVID-19 pandemic is most relevant to the Hong
Kong National Security Law. The Hong Kong law came amidst the coronavirus pandemic, and
during the time of its announcement, the U.S. was very much distracted in handling their rising
COVID-19 cases. With China’s desire to draw out foreign influence from Hong Kong, the timing
of the national security law actually makes a lot of sense since their adversary, the U.S., was
distracted by a global health crisis. The impeccable timing on China’s part makes it more
difficult to undo and much harder for Hong Kong to gain back their state sovereignty.
Combatting any form of Chinese human rights abuses will require more than just the declaration
of the Hong Kong Human Rights Bill. Given the U.S.’ relationship with China, and depending
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on the new presidency of the U.S. come inauguration of Joe Biden in 2021, strict economic
sanctions actually may be the most effective method.
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Conclusion
Three teachable lessons can be learned from these case studies. Time, effort, and finances
that are spent on information security should be increased; second, risk analysts should consider
the social and political repercussions; lastly, do not put anything on your computer that would
want others reading. Sony especially received this wakeup call too late and could not resolve
their errors. Common computer hygiene and security practices such as updated software and
security patches, avoiding phishing scams, and using anti-virus software, can and should be
supported. However, these practices are inadequate to avert persistent and sophisticated attacks,
such as those from North Korean hackers.46 Cybersecurity is a dynamic process involving human
attackers who continue to adapt and quickly learn from their mistakes. Attacks can be endlessly
inventive when motivated. As a result, cybersecurity needs people better versed in public culture
and social dynamics. The history of cyberspace is relatively short, but the pace of history is
rapidly accelerating as technologies, and more importantly the hackers, improve and develop.
The cyberspace grants a new way to achieve strategic advantage, particularly for small
and developing powers. Whereas in the physical realm there are threats of nuclear catastrophe
and warfighting, the cyber realm offers the ability to manipulate flow of information without risk
of physical warfare, at least not quite as much. In one instance, the Israeli Defense Forces
bombed the Palestinian cyber headquarters in Hamas in 2019 after a brutal fight between Hamas
in Gaza and Israel.47 The number of events that show merging between cyberspace and the
physical realm will continue to increase. Simple and static approaches are not well suited to deal
with continued technological advancement, increased access to technology, and changing
cyberspace norms.
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Every global power is caught in what the late diplomat George Kennan calls a “perpetual
rhythm of struggle,” that is, a non-stop conflict between states. The increased access to
technology has enabled cyberspace as a new competitive playing field in international relations
for smaller powers. However, cyberspace is difficult to navigate because of how increasingly
enmeshed it is becoming in international politics and security. Emmy-winning journalist Bruce
Sussman describes it best: “…we, as a society, were on a two-lane road. The left lane was the
physical world, and the right lane was the cyber world. Now, here we are, passing a sign that
says ‘Lanes Merge Ahead.’”48 Alongside further research, international and domestic
communities must address the non-technical approaches to cybersecurity. The best way to do this
is to employ people in non-technical roles to assist in analyzing cybercrime and risk analysis.
While there have been meetings to discuss, cyberspace will still be evolving.
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